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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2063 
 ___________ 
 
 CARLO S. SMART, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
WARDEN KIRBY 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 1-11-cv-00948) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Joseph E. Irenas 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 16, 2011 
 Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: July 7, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Carlo Smart, an inmate at FCI-Fairton, appeals the District Court’s order 
dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard 
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to its factual findings.  See Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  For the reasons discussed below, we will summarily affirm the District 
Court’s order.  
In October 2007, Smart pleaded guilty in the District Court to transporting stolen 
goods in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314, and was sentenced to 27 
months’ imprisonment.  Soon thereafter, the State of New Jersey revoked Smart’s parole; 
Smart was held in state custody on the parole violation until January 2010.  He was then 
released to federal custody and began serving his federal sentence.    
In April 2010, Smart filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  In this motion, he 
claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective both because he failed to inform Smart of 
the possibility that his federal sentence could run consecutively to his state sentence for 
the parole violation and because he failed to request that the District Court order the 
sentences to run concurrently.  The District Court denied these claims on the merits.   
Smart then filed the petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 that is at issue here.  He 
claimed that (1) his trial counsel was ineffective for the same reasons set forth in his 
§ 2255 motion; (2) the District Court violated 18 U.S.C. § 3584 and United States 
Sentencing Guidelines § 5G1.3 by failing to state during sentencing whether the sentence 
would run consecutively or concurrently to the not-yet-imposed state sentence; and (3) 
federal authorities erred by releasing him to state custody and permitting the state 
sentence to commence before the federal sentence.  The District Court concluded that it 
lacked jurisdiction to review Smart’s petition because the claims could be raised only in a 
§ 2255 motion, and thus dismissed it.  Smart then filed a timely notice of appeal.   
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We will affirm the District Court’s order.  As an initial matter, we agree with the 
District Court that Smart’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and sentencing 
error can be pursued only under § 2255.  While a prisoner may rely on § 2241 to 
challenge the execution of a sentence, see Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 485 (3d Cir. 
2001), Smart has not raised such a claim.  His sentencing claim alleges that the District 
Court erred in imposing the underlying sentence.  Cf. Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 
478 (3d Cir. 1990) (explaining that challenge to a Bureau of Prisons’ decision may 
proceed under § 2241).  His claim concerning his counsel’s performance likewise 
represents a straightforward attack on the legality of his sentence.  Presumptively, these 
types of claims may be raised only in a § 2255 motion.  See United States v. Eakman, 
378 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2004) (claim of sentencing error); Application of Galante, 437 
F.2d 1164, 1165 (3d Cir. 1971) (ineffective assistance of counsel). 
There is an exception to the general rule requiring prisoners to proceed under 
§ 2255 where “the remedy by [§ 2255] motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the 
legality of [the] detention.”  § 2255(e).  In In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 
1997), we explained that § 2255 may be inadequate or ineffective where an intervening 
change in law has potentially made the conduct for which the petitioner was convicted 
non-criminal.  However, this narrow exception does not apply here:  section 2255 is not 
inadequate or ineffective in this case simply because the District Court has previously 
refused to grant relief and § 2255(h)’s gatekeeping requirements limit Smart’s ability to 
litigate his current claims.  See Cradle, 290 F.3d at 539.  Therefore, the District Court 
was correct to dismiss these claims.  See Application of Galante, 437 F.2d at 1165 (“This 
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Court has time and again ruled that in a situation such as here presented habeas corpus 
relief is unavailable for lack of jurisdiction.”).   
We also conclude that Smart’s final claim — that it was improper for federal 
authorities to relinquish jurisdiction over him to New Jersey after his federal sentencing 
— lacks merit.  We have explained that “[t]he exercise of jurisdiction over a prisoner 
who has violated the law of more than one sovereignty and the priority of prosecution of 
the prisoner is solely a question of comity between the sovereignties which is not subject 
to attack by the prisoner.”  Bowman v. Wilson, 672 F.2d 1145, 1154 (3d Cir. 1982).  
Smart thus lacks standing to challenge the sequence in which he was required to serve his 
sentences.  See id.; see also Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1997).   
Accordingly, the District Court properly dismissed Smart’s § 2241 petition, and 
we will summarily affirm its order.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.   
 
